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Introduction
In the context of increasing ethnic and racial tensions in several European countries and growing inuence of far right political parties in some of these countries, welfare use by immigrants (and more generally, the cost of immigration) is gaining importance in both the political and scientic debates. Research on this topic has emerged in the 1990s' in the USA leading to some controversial ndings (Borjas (1990) ; Borjas (1999) ; Kaushal (2005) ). In Europe, and particularly in France, such studies remain very rare. Recently, some empirical research tried to measure immigrants' responses to dierences in welfare systems across European countries. The idea is to measure the extent to which the choice of a destination country within the European continent is correlated with the more or less generosity of its welfare system. Research on this topic nds little empirical support to the welfare magnets hypothesis elaborated by Borjas (Brucker, Epstein, McCormick, Saint-Paul, Venturini, and Zimmermann (2002) ; Nannestad (2007) ). Moreover, several studies address the issue of the validity of the welfare magnets approach in the European context. Immigration legislations and policies are so dierent across European countries, on the one hand, and the process of legal immigration is so dicult in the context of restrictive policies widespread all over the continent, on the other hand, that speaking of immigrants' choices of their destination country is quite unrealistic. Evidence has been more convincing on immigrants' responses to geographical dierences in the sizes of the foreign-born populations, or co-ethnics populations, rather than to welfare dierentials (Card (2007) ; Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund (2003) ; Zavodny (2005) ). Network eects seem to be more powerful than welfare magnets.
However, the literature on immigration and welfare is also interested in measuring the extent to which immigrants' nancial contribution to the welfare system is more of less signicant than their welfare dependency. Here the underlying hypothesis is that immigrants' welfare dependency is higher than the one of comparable natives, because of a moral hazard issue specic to immigration (Nannestad (2007) ). This approach is typical of the economic approach of immigration in terms of a cost-benet analysis (see, for instance, Borjas (1994) ). Studies on this`welfare gap' have been set forth both in the USA and in Europe (see, for instance, Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) ). Borjas and Hilton (1996) nd that only a minor part of the initial gap between natives and immigrants remain unexplained after controlling for a wide range of covariates. In Europe, Brucker, Epstein, McCormick, Saint-Paul, Venturini, and Zimmermann (2002) study this gap across several European countries and nd some support for the hypothesis of immigrants' specic moral hazard.
De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) explore the issue of welfare migration across the countries of the pre-enlargement European Union and nd a signicant but small eect of the generosity of welfare on migration decisions. More recently, a French study has tried to measure immigrants' welfare dependency in France (Gélot and Minni (2009) ). The authors nd that African immigrants are more dependent on welfare, as far as employment and income measures are concerned. However, African immigrants seem to have a lower access to some public services, such as health care and housing.
Despite some empirical support for a higher immigrants' dependency on welfare, the interpretation of these ndings does not go without saying. Immigrants' dependency may indeed be related to their exposure to intense ethnic and racial discrimination in the labour and housing markets. It may also reect their higher vulnerability to the economic situation (i.e. they are the rst to be laid o during recessions). This is the reason why policy implications of the literature on immigration and welfare are still controversial. Should the State exclude migrants (especially recently arrived ones) from some welfare programs, or should it rather increase the social protection of immigrants, especially during economic crisis?
There is now a substantial economic literature on the location choices of immigrants in their destination countries. For instance, in a pioneering study, Bartel (1989) has shown that post-1964 U.S. immigrants are more geographically concentrated than natives of the same age and ethnicity, and reside in cities with a large ethnic population. In a much-quoted article, Borjas (1999) found that U.S. immigrant welfare recipients are more heavily clustered in high-benet states that the immigrants who do not receive welfare, or than natives. This nding was then disputed by Kaushal (2005) who nds that safety-net programs have little eect on the location choices of newly arrived low-skilled unmarried immigrant women. In Europe, some studies have also examined the welfare participation rates of immigrants. For instance, in an empirical analysis using Swedish data, Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) nd that immigrants use welfare to a greater extent than natives, and that dierences cannot be explained by observable characteristics. However, to the best of our knowledge, no econometric study has focused on the access of immigrants to social housing programs which are frequently implemented in Europe.
Our study is devoted to this specic issue. It examines the empirical links between social housing policy and location choices of immigrants in France. In France, the main public housing policy is the HLM (habitations à loyer modéré, dwelling with a moderate rent ) program. Any family is eligible for residing in a HLM dwelling provided that the head of the family is allowed to live in France and that income per unit of consumption lies below a threshold, which depends on the region of residence and is updated each year. Eligible families may apply for a HLM in any city (commune ) where such public programs exist, regardless of their current place of residence or nationality. Today, more than 12 millions of persons live in a HLM.
Despite the fact that in France, migration waves were quite intense during the launching of the rst program of HLM construction, the massive presence of immigrants in such dwellings is rather a recent phenomenon (Barou (2002) ; Barou (2006) ). Up to the sixties, immigrants lived overwhelmingly in shanty towns, either in very insalubrious hovels or in private cheap hotels.
In year 1971, the government decided to demolish these uninhabitable buildings and immigrants were gradually rehoused, mostly in HLM. However, Pinçon (1981) shown that immigrants had at that time a lower probability to live in a HLM dwelling, once socioeconomic covariates were taken into account. In particular, his study shed light on the intense selection mechanisms of immigrants who were accepted in HLM dwellings. According to him, the HLM administration was indeed concerned about the quality of cohabitation between natives and immigrants, which was perceived as problematic especially for non European migrants. From the nineties, immigrants, and also more generally low-income native families, began to be more and more numerous in HLM dwellings (Barou (2005) ). Moreover, at the same moment, residential mobility out of the HLM drastically decreased.
In this paper, we characterize the main individual and contextual determinants of the probability to live in a HLM for immigrants residing in France. We use individual information coming from large extracts of the French population censuses conducted by INSEE (Institut National de la Statitstique et des Etudes Economiques, Paris) in 1982 Paris) in , 1990 Paris) in , and 1999 . The census source is especially relevant for our study since it allows us to deal with signicant samples of immigrants, according to their origin country, these groups being generally too small in French surveys. It contains relevant information about the observable individual characteristics of immigrants (country of birth, age, marital situation, occupation, human capital, etc.). We add to this information some contextual variables that are extracted from the exhaustive censuses. For instance, we precisely know the size of the migrant's community and the number of foreigners in his/her city (commune) of residence, but also the number of persons living in HLM buildings in this city at each census date. Our rst objective is thus to estimate the eects of these individual and contextual covariates on the probability to live at a given date (namely, at the date of the census) in a HLM for natives and for the dierent groups of immigrants (according to their country of origin, the size of their family, their education, their age, etc.), and the evolution of this probability through time.
The identication of the model is permitted by the fact that the proportion of persons living in HLMs varies across cities (communes) and over time. To limit the diculties associated with the analysis of very large samples (since, by denition, population censuses are exhaustive), we have concentrated our statistical analysis to one-fourth random subsamples of three censuses, namely those conducted in years 1982, 1990, and 1999 .
These subsamples provide precise information about individual socioeconomic characteristics, such as age, sex, education, matrimonial status, socioprofessional category, employment status, country of birth and current nationality (i.e., at the date of the survey). 2 They also contain information about the type of dwelling in which the survey respondents live, and in particular whether they live in a social housing dwelling at the census date. Moreover, using data from the exhaustive censuses, we have augmented this individual set of characteristics by adding local contextual covariates, such as the total number of inhabitants in the city (commune) where the survey respondent lives, the proportion of persons living in social housing dwellings and the proportions of migrants from the various possible origins in this city. Table 1 reports the proportions of persons residing in France at each census date (1982, 1990, 1999 As far as it is possible, the subsequent statistical analysis will try to distinguish the country of origin for the immigrants coming from these six countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) since they correspond to the largest migrant groups living in France. The other groups of immigrants being less numerous, we are obliged to aggregate them for statistical purposes. Thus immigrants from Southern-Eastern Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam) are grouped together. This is also the case for those coming from Sub-Saharan Africa, from Eastern Europe, from other countries of Western Europe (excluding Spain, Italy and Portugal), and from Northern and Southern America.
Descriptive statistics
[Insert Table 1 around here] Table 2 provides information on sociodemographic characteristics of immigrants and natives.
Compared to natives, immigrants are less frequently managers, engineers, or executives, more often blue-collar workers or unemployed. They are also more often employed in the private sector.
They are signicantly less educated, but this educational gap has decreased over our time period.
3 In France, immigrants' children become French when they turn 18, provided that they were born in France.
4 In our analysis, the term immigrant refers to the foreign born population. The acquisition of the French citizenship and its consequences on the employment status of immigrants residing in France has been studied by Fougère and Sa (2009). For instance, in 1999, the proportion of individuals who graduated from a university (4 years of schooling after the baccalauréat, which is high-school nal exam in France) is higher among the migrants.
[Insert Table 2 French census, information about social housing corresponds to the whole building the household lives in, while in the 1990 and 1999 censuses, the information concerns either the individual apartment occupied by the interviewee or the whole building he/she lives in. In order to be able to compare the three censuses, we thus dene the dependent variable as the occupancy of a housing unit in an HLM building. Depending on the census date, we sometimes know if the social housing unit is rented or owned, but here again, we do not distinguish between these two occupancy statuses for comparability concerns.
Usually, the only pre-requisite to apply to social housing is to earn below a certain threshold (dened by the municipality). However, this does not mean that everyone who is eligible will have access to social housing. Indeed, in order to increase social diversity in social housing and to avoid the ghettoization of the most disadvantaged populations, the thresholds are far for being low; theoretically, 60 to 70% of the French population is indeed eligible to occupy a social housing unit according to the income thresholds. This is clearly above the 20% legal target which is far from being eectively reached in every municipality. In a context of increasing real estate's prices and growing diculties in accommodation for middle and lower classes, this inevitably leads to a situation of sharp rationing in the social housing market. In Paris, for example, there are 100,000
applications each year (among which 40,000 are new), but only 8,000 housing units are allocated a year (Dietrich-Ragon 2010). Applications are ranked according to emergency criteria, among which extreme health and family reasons are the most important.
Once obtained, a social housing unit is very seldom vacated, which participates to the rationing of the market. Eviction is a very complex, long and costly procedure that is almost never engaged by social housing agencies. This leads to situations of durable -not to say endless -occupation, and sometimes quasi-inheritance, of social housing units within some privileged (or newly privileged) populations. In 2009, a new law has abolished the right of HLM occupants to stay in their habitation as soon as their income is more than twice the threshold.
Most of French municipalities are of small size. According to census data, the average size of a the analysis to municipalities with less than 500 inhabitants, we nd that these results vanish:
the increase in the total population and in the number of immigrants is more or less the same in the ve categories. Conversely, for the municipalities with initially more than 1,000 inhabitants, the correlation between the variation in the number of immigrants and the initila proportion of persons living in social housing units is maximum. Initially more social housing is correlated with more immigrants and especially more immigrants from North Africa. [Insert Table 3 around here] [Insert Figure 4 around here]
3.2 Social housing and immigrants : odds ratios Figure 5 presents odds-ratios for the conditional probability to live in a social housing dwelling,
given that the individual is an immigrant, an immigrant from Maghreb, or an immigrant from Southern Europe, respectively in years 1982 and 1999. Thus P s [HLM | Imm] denotes the probability for an immigrant residing in the city (commune) s to live in a social housing dwelling, and P s [HLM | N at] denotes the corresponding probability for a French native residing in the same city s. Then the odds-ratio is dened as:
The values of this ratio OR indicate to what extent immigrants (or a given subgroup of immigrants) are more or less likely to live in social housing than natives. For instance, if the oddratio is greater than one, it means that immigrants are more likely than natives to live in a HLM in that city. Figure 5 provides the local values of the odds-ratios OR(Imm), OR(M aghrebian Imm) and OR(SE Imm).
[Insert Figure 5 around here]
Comparing Figures 1, 3 and 5, provides a rst set of facts about inequality in immigrants access to social housing over French territory. While immigrants are very concentrated around Paris, it is striking to notice that the odds-ratio of the probability to live in a HLM for an immigrant is less than 1 in this region. This probability is surprisingly higher in more rural areas, which do not include the biggest cities and are less densely populated, such as Britanny and the center of France (where immigrants are very rare; see Figure 3 ). The results do not change much from 1982 to 1999, except for Southern Europeans. In 1982, their probability of living in a social housing dwelling is very high almost everywhere in France. In 1999 however, this probability has decreased in most of the areas, but it remains high in Britanny and the South East of France. This suggests that social housing might have worked as a transitional accommodation facility for these populations (as it is also often the case for natives), as explicited in Edou (1998) or Barou (2002) . As far as they get more and more assimilated into French society, Italians, Spanish and Portuguese leave social housing and most probably for private housing or home ownership. This does not seem to be the case for North Africans; their patterns of residence in social housing buildings are very similar in 1982 and 1999, which suggests that they remain in this type of housing much longer than migrants from Southern European migrants. More suprisingly, the areas where their probability to live in a social housing building is higher are located in regions where their presence is rather low.
Focusing on the region around Paris shows that, between 1982 and 1999, the probability to live in a social housing dwelling conditional on being an immigrant from Sub-Saharan Africa, an immigrant from North-Africa, or an immigrant from Southern Europe, has decreased for all immigrants in this region, especially for those coming from Sub-Saharan and Southern-European countries (see Figure 6 ).
[Insert Figure 6 around here]
Of course, the previous analysis is just descriptive. The following section is devoted to a regression analysis that helps understanding the extent to which observable personal and city characteristics may explain these descriptive patterns. Table 4 show that in general, migrants live more frequently in social housing buildings than French natives, other observables being equal. In particular, this probability is higher for migrants from Turkey, Morocco, Southeast Asia, Algeria, Tunisia and Sub-Saharan Africa (in descending order). It is generally lower for migrants who have gained French citizenship (excepted for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa). Women are more likely to live in a social housing dwelling than men. It is also the case for singles and lone mothers.
Social determinants for living in social housing
Socio-professional category and educational attainment also have a highly signicant eect on this probability. It is higher for blue-collar and white-collar workers, unemployed workers, but also for public rm workers and civil servants. This probability is a decreasing function of age, but it has increased through time, because of the increase in the public housing stock over the period.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
Tables 5 incorporates second-order interaction terms between the geographical origin of migrants (Northern Africa, Southern Europe, other countries) and some contextual local covariates, such as the logarithm of the city population, the proportion of persons living in public housing dwellings in this city, and the proportions of migrants from Northern Africa, Southern Europe or other countries (excluding Spain, Italy, Portugal, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) in the same city.
Southern Europeans are the only migrants more likely than natives to live in a public housing dwelling when the size of the city is large. In addition, all migrants are more likely (than natives) to live in a HLM when the proportion of people living in social housing is large. However, North
Africans are less likely to live in a HLM than natives when the fraction of migrants, including themselves, is large in the city. Because the fraction of natives in the city is equal to one minus the sum of all groups of migrants, it essentially means that North Africans are more likely to live in a HLM when the proportion of natives is large in the city. Interestingly, this feature is observed for all groups of migrants. Hence, migrants tend to live in HLM when many natives live in the city.
[Insert Table 5 around here] Table 6 improves on Table 5 by introducing third-order interactions between the individual origin of the migrants, the fraction of people living in a HLM in the city, and the fraction of migrants of each origin in the city. Again, the omitted category comprises the natives. First, let us examine the main second-order eects. They are broadly in line with those found in Table 5 .
Here, though, all migrants are less likely to live in a HLM than natives in large cities (Southern Europeans rather than positive in Table 5 are identical to natives in this respect). Again, when the fraction of inhabitants living in a HLM is large in the city, migrants are less likely than natives to inhabit a HLM. Again, in broad agreement with results in Table 5 , migrants are in general more likely to live in a HLM when the fraction of natives is large in the city. Now, the third-order interactions show that, in cities with many HLMs and many migrants (irrespective of the origin), migrants are less likely to inhabit a social housing. Put dierently, migrants of all origins live less often in a HLM when the city has plenty of social housing and when the fraction of natives is high. Can we talk of discrimination? There is no causal evidence, just some indicative elements.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
To understand how the allocation of migrants, HLM housing, and migrants within HLMs, evolved through time and space, [Insert Table 7 around here]
Finally, Table 8 shows the results of a regression of the dierence in the proportions of dierent groups of migrants in 1999 on the same dierence in proportions in 1982. Essentially, if the coecient is small or even negative, it means that there is no persistance, or even reversion in the location choices of migrants. If the coecients are positive, then initial choices (sometimes forces, indeed) persist. And this is what we observe. Most coecients are close to one.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
Conclusion
In this study, we have examined the empirical links between social housing policy and location choices of immigrants in France. More specically, we have tried to characterize the main individual and contextual determinants of the probability for immigrants to live in a HLM, which is the main public housing policy in France. For that purpose, we use individual information coming from large (one-fourth) extracts of the French population censuses conducted by INSEE (Paris) in 1982, 1990, and 1999 .
Our estimates show that, in general, migrants live more frequently in social housing than French natives, other observables being equal. In particular, this probability is higher for migrants from Turkey, Morocco, Southeast Asia, Algeria, Tunisia and Sub-Saharan Africa (in descending order).
It is generally lower for migrants who have gained French citizenship (excepted for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa).
We nd also that migrants are less likely to live in a HLM than natives in large cities. When the fraction of inhabitants living in a HLM is large in the city, migrants are less likely than natives to live in a HLM. Moreover, migrants are in general more likely to live in a HLM when the fraction of natives is large in the city. On the whole, in cities with many HLMs and many migrants (irrespective of the origin), migrants are less likely to inhabit a social housing. Put dierently, migrants of all origins live less often in a HLM when the city has plenty of social housing and when the fraction of natives is high.
The ongoing economic crisis should create greater diculties in the access of immigrants to social housing. Several ocial reports have underlined that, nowadays in France, 3.5 millions of persons are living in poor housing conditions and that 1.5 million of persons are waiting to have access to an HLM dwelling. 6 This excess demand may correspond to 900,000 dwellings. This explains why housing prices have increased by 150 percent on average between 1995 and 2008, while the average income of households has only increased by 60 percent during the same period.
Meanwhile, rents rose twice as fast as ination. Nowadays, expenses related to housing correspond to 33 percent of the household average disposable income. No doubt that immigrants will bear the brunt of this shortage in the next few years. Policy recommendations which could help to limit their diculties include a substantial and fast increase in the supply of public housing, but also the introduction of a more equitable procedure of allocation of applicants to HLM dwellings (by using, for instance, anonymous applications).
In a further study, we will concentrate both on the movements between public and private housing both for natives and for immigrants. This study, that will use individual longitudinal data, should improve our understanding on the impact of the French public housing policy on location choices of immigrants. 
